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Abstract Curbing global warming by setting long term maxima for temperature rise or
concentrations of greenhouse gases defines spaces within which further emissions of these
gases are to remain (referred to here as ‘carbon spaces’). This paper addresses questions
related to how to share between countries the carbon space and/or efforts to stay within it, in
the perspective of sustainable development; different allocation mechanisms are reviewed,
responding to criteria such as ‘responsibility’ for climate change,‘capability’ to engage in
abating it, and ‘potential’ or future contribution. The carbon space remaining at any time will
depend on effective mitigation up till that time, and will condense if more stringent maxima
are to be set; per capita this space becomes smaller with rising population. Sharing the carbon
space in a fair way requires “convergence” of currently widely unequal per capita emissions.
If the world is to stay within the carbon space consistent with < 2◦ warming, then developed
economies—the wealthiest sources of greenhouse gases should quickly and deeply engage
in mitigation. Also, substantial mitigation is to take place in developing countries and that
this will require substantial support to developing countries (financially, technologically).
Changing development paths can make a major contribution to climate change mitigation;
this requires changes in investment, production and consumption patterns. Green New Deals
as proposed in the context of a widened response to the current economic crisis could become
a first phase of a fundamental transition towards a decarbonised global economy worldwide.
Concerns to do with equity as well as sustainability must be incorporated and integrated into
coherent transitory strategies.
Keywords Carbon space · Climate change · Sustainable development · Burden sharing ·
Differentiation
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“The world is facing a global climate crisis that requires urgent … action “ (South Centre
2007). UN SG Ban Ki-Moon has called climate change a “defining issue of our era”. These
are political assessments but they are based on a wealth of scientific data collected in
four 5-yearly assessments by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (e.g. IPCC
2001, 2007). Developing countries are more vulnerable to climate change and have rel-
atively less capacity to adapt to its impacts—despite having had little to do with caus-
ing climate change until recently—and this has occupied me the last decade or so in the
context of IPCC, and the UN Committee of Development Policy (see e.g. CDP 2007,
2009).
The growing agreement on these matters does not mean that it is clear what is do be
done about them and who is to do what. Clearly the costs of adaptation to climate change
need to be covered and it seems obvious that this is done in accordance with some mea-
sure of fairness. But if the world wants to avoid the nastier types of damages it needs
to avoid atmospheric warming beyond certain levels. That will limit the space for further
emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases. With growing numbers of peo-
ple and rising average levels of welfare it gets very crowded in the carbon space and the
claims on it are growing rapidly. In this address I will look at how to share that space
and/or efforts to stay within it (Sects. 4–7) in the perspective of sustainable development
(Sect. 8), but before that I want, in Sects. 1–3, to ‘contextualise’ the climate crisis, give
some details on it and the way it is being approached politically, and define ‘sustainable
development’.
1 Global Economic Development: Uneven, Unsustainable and Unstable
We live in a world plagues with dilemmas, crises and trends that move it away from what
most people thinking about this see as the global common goods. Starting with an issue that
has always been a deep concern at ISS, world inequality has been reported as “high and
rising” (Ocampo and Vos 2008; see also UNDP 2002). Ocampo and Vos (ibid.) conclude that
there is no automatic tendency towards income convergence and that differences in initial
conditions tend to be exacerbated by the inequitable functioning of world markets (ibid).
That statement brings us to an underlying process: that of globalisation, especially in the
form it increasingly took after say 1970: that of liberalisation, deregulation and several other
goodies that neo-liberal ideology had in store, such as the global advance of an increas-
ingly free market system. As Milanovic (2005) pointed out: the openness that globalisation
calls for may exacerbate inter-country inequality and is likely to increase inequality in poor
countries—which, in the long run, is socially unsustainable.
Globalisation in the neo-liberal mode also adds to the propensity of economic develop-
ment to be unsustainable in an ecological sense. We see manifestations of that in the emerging
problems with fisheries, water scarcities, competition over land use, food crises. We also see
it in the domain of climate change. Measured in one particular way (that of the so-called
‘ecological footprint’) the world is calculated to now consume 25% more of those resources
than the planet’s capacity to regenerate them (its ‘biocapacity’, or ‘environmental space’); it
can do so only at the expense of its reserves in terms of natural stocks and capacities.
Systemic features underlying these various global crises and dilemmas include:
– Virtually unaccountable economic agents operating on socially and politically “unembed-
ded” (Altvater 2009) markets (un”submerged”, as Polanyi (1944) called them), beyond
any form of co-ordination and direction;
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– an enhanced short-sightedness in political and economic systems, already denounced
some 90 years ago by welfare economist Pigou (1920, 1962 reprint: I.II.3) as a ‘defec-
tive’ (and even ‘perverted’) ‘telescopic faculty’ leading to a shifting of social costs of
private enterprise on to future generations;
– a prevailing culture and ideology supportive of market forces driven economic growth,
rather than of rights based human development and responsibility for today’s weak, for
future generations and for biodiversity.
The current economic recession has augmented the concern over the cracks in the global
economic system fire. By the end of 2008 it had triggered the realisation the international
community was to go for a New Bretton Woods (Gordon Brown), a New Multilateralism and
a “more inclusive and sustainable globalization” (Zoellick 2008), new green policies and a
system that would put these in place.
Dealing with the entire set of crises in a coherent way will require a new orientation of
development—this time in countries North as well as South—and systemic reforms. I do
not have the possibility to address here the fundamental systemic aspects but will look at a
number of economic process-oriented aspects. If we are to see—globally, but especially in
the developing countries—sustainable and equitable economic development, then we will
need structural change in world economic activities.
Such structural change needs to include—and now I come to my key theme—a transition
to a carbon free (or at least carbon poor) pattern of economic development, clean in terms of
its content of greenhouse gases, and lean in terms of its energy and land use. Some see that
as a ‘green new deal’ in the face of the current economic crisis—killing two birds with one
stone: warming as well as unemployment.
2 Climate Change: and Climate Change Negotiations: A Helicopter View
Climate change may result from natural processes but the current levels of warming are to
a large extent due to human activity (IPCC 2007): emissions of so-called greenhouse gases
(GHGs) amongst which notably Carbon Dioxide (CO2). This gas is emitted through energy
use (especially fossil fuels) and changes in land use (about 70% and 30% respectively). I shall
focus on energy-related emissions, of CO2 in particular. GHG emissions lead to a building
up of GHG-concentrations in the atmosphere that give rise to a range of phenomena such
as atmospheric warming, changing weather regimes, ice cap melting, sea level rise etcetera.
These, in turn, generate impacts on natural and social systems, such as changing natural
resource supplies, with adverse impacts on food and water, biodiversity and human health.
Since the Industrial Revolution over 500 billion tons of Carbon (almost 1850 billion tonnes
of CO2) have been released in the atmosphere, primarily by the industrialised countries; the
current level of annual C-emission is about 9 billion tons. Table 2 (left hand side) shows the
shares in emissions of different countries and global regions. Currently global warming is at
.7◦C above pre-industrial levels; with economies developing in a ‘business as usual’—mode
(BAU), temperatures would be up 5 to 6◦C by 2100, with catastrophic social and ecological
impacts (IPCC 2007; CDP 2007).
The main responses to climate change are directed at dealing with the effects of it (‘adap-
tation’) or reducing the emissions that give rise to it (‘mitigation’). In this address I will focus
on mitigation and how that involves or may involve developing countries.
In the Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC 1992) countries have agreed
to co-operate towards achieving stabilization of concentrations of greenhouse gases at a level
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that would prevent “dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system, within
a time frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally, …, and to enable economic
development to proceed in a sustainable manner” (adapted from FCCC, art. 2; italics mine).
The 1997 Kyoto Protocol intended to elaborate and implement this Convention in the con-
text of a framework including objectives for emissions reductions in 2012 for developed
(“Annex I”) countries. In 2007 the Bali Action Plan (BAP; UNFCCC 2007) was established
by the parties to UNFCCC, to arrive at a new agreement in Copenhagen, 2009, on cooperative
action on climate issues beyond 2012. Developed countries are to accept commitments in
mitigation, technology transfer, and in facilitating adaptation and mitigation efforts in devel-
oping countries beyond what these countries consider ‘appropriate’ in terms of their domestic
mitigative actions. Details and extent of these commitments are currently being negotiated.
There appear to be thresholds in predicted impacts that suggest the desirability of caps on
warming at 2◦C by 2100. Internationally, there is a growing sense that this is an appropriate
target. If adopted, this could be taken as an expression of the global concern over its intertem-
poral and intergenerational ethical responsibilities in the climate domain. Recently disclosed
evidence on melting of ice in e.g. Antarctica suggests that a maximum of appr. 1.5◦C might
be more appropriate. Staying below such levels of warming will require massive emission
reductions at an unprecedented scale: going towards a carbon-free global economy, replacing
fossil fuels by non C-containing alternatives (solar, wind, etcetera), reducing the energy-con-
tent of production and consumption It may also affect income levels and lifestyles of the
wealthy and the middle classes. Technicians tell us (e.g. Pacala and Socolow 2004; Stern
et al. 2006; Bierbaum et al. 2007) that keeping warming below 3◦ is possible, and even
2◦ may be, with advanced versions of currently available technologies, but that will be far
from easy and may even generate various other problems (nuclear waste—related problems,
competition over agricultural land, etcetera). Further innovation must be achieved—most
definitively so if targets below 2◦C are to be met and if economic growth is to continue.
The cost of going for 2–3◦ maximum over the next 1–2 centuries may amount to the
equivalent of a 1–2% GDP loss per annum (Stern et al. 2006; UNDP 2007). Would that be
that worth it? Stern calculated the costs of inaction and found these under certain, sometimes
far-fetched, assumptions to be 5 and even up to 20 times higher than the costs of mitigation
as calculated by him (Stern et al. 2006). So, at the global level, curbing warming below 2◦
seems to be not only affordable as a premium worth paying to avoid sometimes catastrophic
risks and associated damages but possibly even desirable in an enlightened and future ori-
ented cost-benefit analysis. However, temperatures would still go up, due to the fact that
GHGses will stay in the atmosphere often for long periods of time. So inevitably there will
be increasing impacts that societies will have to live with and adapt to. Adaptive capacity
depends on the social and economic development level and here again poor countries are less
well endowed. Adaptation will impose more of a burden the longer the world will wait with
deep mitigation.
If the transition towards a carbon free or GHG-poor society is not effectively done, other
options considered might be interim ones like Carbon Capturing and Storage e.g. in old oil
and gas fields. Beyond that, new, unproven and potentially very risky technologies in the
domain of ‘geo-engineering’ have been proposed (e.g. large scale interventions in the atmo-
sphere or even beyond, aiming at diverting solar radiation by mirrors in space, or reducing
atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations e.g. through ocean iron fertilization). I will not
explore this Prometheusian approach further here.
This leaves us with a final question: who is expected to do what in order to arrive and ensure
positions within the carbon space? That, to a large degree, is the substance of the current
negotiations towards a new global deal to replace the Kyoto Protocol, in Copenhagen, by the
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end of 2009. The first draft of a negotiation text is being discussed in Bonn as this valedictory
address is presented, but progress is uncomfortably slow. Any global compact must provide
a credible approach that is in the interest of the South. Some of the factors accounting for
the present lack of progress are rooted in a deep deficit of trust between negotiating parties.
Some crucial questions are:
– How and how much will the developed countries contribute to the unavoidable adaptation
burden resulting from the past, energy intensive economic growth in the North?
– How will mitigative actions by developed countries affect development in developing and
emerging economies?
– Why should developing countries engage in mitigation whilst industrialised countries do
not meet their Kyoto targets (or at least: not in its own territory)?
– Why should developing countries be involved at all in mitigation, when it wasn’t these
countries but the industrialised ones that primarily caused climate-related problems?
– Why would the developing countries trust industrialised ones when they speak of coopera-
tion and assistance for mitigation undertaken by developing countries, while the developed
ones in general haven’t lived up to their ODA-commitments?
International support for mitigation (and for adaptation) in developing countries and transfer
of technology might facilitate their getting involved in mitigation, but only to the extent that
the trust deficit is overcome.
Meanwhile, an alternative “road” parallel to the UNFCCC-process has been entered upon:
the shortcut of Zoellick’s “new multilateralism” (Zoellick 2008) which in fact amounts to
extended bilateralism—negotiations between some smaller set of countries, with an asso-
ciated risk of frustrating the multilateral approach under the Convention. In 2007 the G8
set the goal to halve emissions of greenhouse gases by 2050. During the 2008 Hokkaido
Toyako G-8 Summit the “major developing economies” participating in that summit (Brazil,
China, India, Indonesia, Korea, Mexico, South Africa) approved this approach and agreed to
pursue “… nationally appropriate mitigation actions, supported and enabled by technology,
financing and capacity-building, with a view to achieving a deviation from business as usual
emissions” (Hokkaido Toyota Summit 2008). The most recent move along this track was
President Obama’s calling together a “Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate”
(April 2009) where 17 countries discussed climate change (including Brazil, China, India,
Indonesia, Mexico, South Africa with the intention to accelerate the UNFCCC process.1
Developing countries there insisted that short-term goals were needed promising a cutting
back to at least 40% below 1990 emissions by the year 2020. The US so far only went as far
as suggesting a 15% below 2005.
3 Climate Change and Sustainable Development
In 1987 the World Commission on Environment and Development published its report to
the UN: “Our common future”, which launched the perspective of sustainable develop-
ment, defined as: a process of change in which (i) the exploitation of resources (incl. natural
resources), (ii) the direction of investments, (iii) the orientation of technological develop-
ment, and (iv) institutional change are all compatible and enhance both current and future
potentials to meet human needs and aspirations (after WCED 1989:46), by staying within
its ecological, economic and social means or capacities. This was translated at the 1992 UN
1 Thus spoke the meeting’s Chairman in his “Chair’s summary Major Economies Forum on Energy and
Climate, April 28th 2009”. US Dep’t of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Washington DC, April 29 2009.
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Conference on Environment and Development into an action programme, a set of principles
and the signing of two global agreements, one of them (UNFCCC) on climate change.
Prospects for sustainable development in developing countries are adversely affected in
three ways (CDP 2009). The first one is: the damages of climate change including the impacts
on development (especially the Millennium Development Goals). The second one is the spill-
overs of policies in the area of climate change undertaken by the industrialised countries.
The third one is the effects of the adaptation and mitigation activities by and in developing
countries on social conditions and the economies of those countries. The second one of these
may require some illustration. That what happens in developing countries is affected by
economic activity in industrialised countries generally, is clearly illustrated by the spillovers
of the current recession. Climate policies may also have spillovers—some positive, some
negative—in developing countries through changed levels and patterns of trade, and in the
case of rising energy and carbon prices, which may backfire in the form of adverse regressive,
effects on income distributions.
For developing countries to replicate the development path of the industrialised countries
with their heavy reliance on carbon-rich energy sources would amount to running into a
dead-end street. Rather, these countries should choose other, environmentally more benign
development paths directly. Achieving the aims in the international sustainable development
agenda will require a drastic reduction in emissions not only in developed countries (who
in fact are committed to take a lead in this) but also in developing countries. Developing
countries will need assistance in dealing with the impacts of climate change and the adap-
tation needs that follow from it; they require compensation for damages and risks that are
generated largely or fully by already industrialised countries. Capacity building in relation
to adaptation is also required.
In the North, an institutional approach to achieving such mitigation is the mechanism of
putting a cap on the amount of carbon or greenhouse gases that can be emitted, and to sell
(via auctions or direct trading) permits up to that level to those who want to emit. The EU
has such a scheme (although it is working far from well), the US is considering it and there
are proposals to extend this mechanism to at least the OECD region. This mechanism may
not be the most appropriate one for developing countries—most definitely in the less and
least developed countries. Developing countries might be more effectively and efficiently
(certainly if we disregard fallouts in the form of externalities engendered by market-based
mechanisms) involved in mitigation through other schemes. The UN Committee of Develop-
ment Policy has recently proposed an investment-based mitigation strategy in the perspective
of sustainable development (CDP 2007, 2009), to which we shall return below.
4 Carbon Space: A Compartment in the Environmental Space for Sustainable
Development
After Brundland launched the concept of sustainable development in 1987, I began work-
ing on the notion of an ‘environmental space’ for such development—a space demarcated
essentially by the carrying and absorption or sink capacities of the global ecological systems
supporting human societies and societal processes (Opschoor 1987).2 The concept of “envi-
ronmental utilization space” (EUS hereafter) represents an abstract virtual reality: a set of
2 The EUS was suggested originally as a theoretical notion in dynamic environmental economic analysis
(Siebert 1982) and was later proposed as a concept in the development of environmental policy and empirical
research (Opschoor 1987, 1992, 1995). By 1995 the EUS was also known as ‘ecocapacity’ (Weterings and
Opschoor 1992) or ‘ecospace’ (e.g. Opschoor 1995).
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bounds or constraints with respect to claims on nature by society at any point in time related
to the capacity of relevant support systems and processes in the biosphere, such that society
will be able to make such claims in future as well.3
The notion of sustainability is an elusive concept; uncertainties on how natural systems
behave, and lack of knowledge as to how important the continued existence of these sys-
tems is, contribute to that (e.g. Opschoor 2009). Moreover, society may ‘expand’ its EUS
if it successfully engages in the exploration for new resources, in finding new ways to use
materials and environmental services, in restoration of degraded resource systems, etcetera.
To the extent that ‘sustainability’ is undetermined, also the boundaries of the environmental
space will be vague. Given these uncertainties, some went for simple proxy-measures such
as the ‘biocapacity’ in hectares that is available to human society for its use—the ‘ecolog-
ical footprint’ that we already met. Others discerned and investigated sub-spaces such as
one for GHGs, or Carbon (the “carbon space”).4 This more readily allowed for quantifica-
tion– and has proven useful in the context of the global climate negotiations. For instance, the
South Centre (2007) argued that: “… the environmental and carbon emissions space available
for developing countries has been drastically and inequitably reduced by the development
pathways taken by today’s developed countries….”. At the 2008 Poznan climate negotiations
the Chinese delegation pointed out that: “Developing countries need carbon space to their
industrialization and urbanization”. Since then, the notion has been adopted by many other
developing countries and CSOs.
One may define the carbon space as the amount of carbon (or CO2) that can be put into
the atmosphere without this leading to a level of warming—or underlying concentrations of
CO2—that can be considered dangerous (cf. UNFCCC 1992, see above) or otherwise unde-
sirable. So far, the world has not come to an agreed and quantified boundary for this carbon
space. Here, to ease the presentation, I will proceed with the 2◦-objective as mentioned by
EU and South Centre. Figure 1 shows different global spaces for GHGs as trajectories of
how conceivably emissions from human activity should develop in the rest of this century to
arrive at a situation where several different boundaries on warming will be met (the 2◦-cap
corresponding more or less with the curve of 450 ppm).5
The magnitude of the challenge can also be shown in numerical terms (Table 1), where
C-emissions are decomposed in various contributing components. If by 2100 the world is
to be under the 2◦-cap and if average incomes and population levels are to be according to
expectations, then Carbon per unit of GDP is to be reduced by almost 90%. Implicitly, this
amounts to changes in patterns of production and consumption and of energy use, away from
Carbon-containing forms of energy. If the mitigation challenge could not be met through
a combination of using less energy and using cleaner energy, then the only way to staying
3 Sometimes the environmental space is decomposed into national spaces, that interact with one another
through spillovers (like downstream river pollution due to upstream sources), but also through trade. In an
asymmetric world in terms of power relationships, some countries, through trade, may use other countries’
spaces to their disproportionate advantage (‘ecologically uneven exchange’). This has become a matter of
empirical research—I will not touch upon it further here (except to refer to Anderson and Lindroth 2001 and
Rice 2007).
4 This carbon space has been referred to also as: ‘carbon budget’ (Agarwal and Narain 1991), ‘ecocapacity
for CO2-emissions’ (Weterings and Opschoor 1992), “ecological space for climate change” (MacGregor and
Chambwera 2007); the term ‘carbon space’ was first used—as far as I know- by Parikh and Parikh (2001).
5 These trajectories are surrounded with uncertainties of various kinds. Continuing at the current level of
emissions would put into the atmosphere some 360 tons of C and the chance of exceeding 2◦ would be about
70% (60–85%); dropping global emissions with 80% would lead to a risk of exceeding the limit by about 25%
(10–45%) (Meinshausen et al. 2009). If only the industrialised countries were to cut their emissions by 80%,
then global emissions would be such that the odds of exceeding the temperature limit will be 50% (30–75%).
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Fig. 1 Greenhouse gas emission scenarios (2000–2100) consistent with different levels of global; warming.
Source: Stern (2006)
Table 1 The mitigation challenge
Population × Av. Income × Energy intensity × Fuel mix = Carbon emissions
or
Pop × GDP/Pop × E/GDP × C/E = C
Pop GDP/pop E/GDP C/E C
bns PPP$ MJ/$ KgC/GJ GtC
2030 6.42 6,541 12.1 14.8 7.5
2100 11.3 29,730 4.5 13.4 20.4
∼ 60
2100 2◦C 9–11 25–30K To be 7, not 60 2.0
within the 2◦C maximum for the decades ahead would be the nasty way: reducing average
incomes (or even population—if that were at all feasible). Failing these too, the option left
would be to give up on the 2◦C cap. So, the world is caught between a deep blue sea (deeper
than at present) and the devil of unwanted technologies or dwindling incomes.
Speaking of dwindling, the longer economies wait with starting to mitigate, the more the
right hand parts of the curves of Fig. 1 will be pushed down, towards the horizontal axis.
The carbon space will then become compressed—and nearly vanish. Secondly, as the world
population continues to grow (which it is likely to do at least till 2050), then the per capita
carbon space will shrink. There is a third reason to be concerned over the amount of carbon
space left: the curves that I show here relate to an assumed desire to avoid certain effects of
warming—but given that recent studies have given rise to the fear that the adverse effects
are setting in earlier than expected and faster, some have argued that the cap should be put at
lower levels than 2◦. That might become economically very costly and possibly technically
unfeasible.
So far the analysis has been at the level of one world—the planet as a whole and its human
population as a homogeneous entity. Neither reduction is appropriate; here I will bring in at
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least a bit of social sophistication: we live in an unequal world and that is also visible in the
area of climate change.
5 Sharing the Carbon Space
Thinking in terms of EUS evokes the question of who has access to this space, or how this
access is distributed or shared.
There are several categories of potential users: (a) the present generation of humans, (b)
future generations, and (c) non-human biodiversity. We will focus on the first two. Obviously,
sustainable development requires development where it is needed, before moral obligations
to future generations can be considered. There can be no ecology without equity—yet: nei-
ther can there be equity without ecology (Sachs 2002). A strict cap on warming would keep
at bay a number of things the world would not like, such as several meters of sea level rise,
drying up rivers in South Asia and China, further droughts in Africa, etcetera. Effectively,
such a cap would potentially safeguard the interests of future generations. So in what follows
I shall restrict myself to sharing between developed and developing countries.
Discussions on sharing the environmental space date back to the preparation for the UN
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), during which it was argued that
developed countries should ‘make space for the South’ and ‘share Environmental Space’, to
allow for the development of poor countries (Hadj-Sadok 1992; Opschoor 1992, 1993; Khor
1997). Echoes of these early calls could be heard in the South Centre (2007) plea (see above).
Much of the once existing Carbon space has been taken in by economic development in
the industrialised part of the world. This still to a large degree influences current emission
patterns (though less so now than in, say, 1990, with China and India moving up rapidly on
lists of emitters (see the first columns of Table 2 below). The question is, what would be a
fair or equitable way of sharing the remaining C-space. Let us look at the carbon space again
and consider envisaged ways to share it (Fig. 2).
Here we see the world moving along a pathway towards a very carbon-poor future (by
about 2050) and we see a path for the rich countries towards that. Global emissions drop by
80% (against the 1990 values). Emissions of the developed countries drops even more than
the global average: with 90%. Even if these heroic assumptions on emissions reduction are
met, they leave the world with a problem: the space remaining for developing countries is
not big enough to allow them to grow even at a constant level of emissions: if they did, then
in 2050 global emissions would be at 6.4 Gt, 10 times as high as would be consistent with
staying below the 2◦ cap. The effective space under the 2◦ cap is rather small—and it is to
be shared by quite a lot of people. Roughly speaking, the developing countries this solution
would amount to a reduction with 60% below their 2000 level. This is much less than the 90%
reduction in the North but yet: per capita emissions in the North would be almost 2.7 times
those of a person in the developing countries. Implicit in the statement by the South Centre
is the request to share in a much fairer way, the overall carbon space. The question is: how,
on what principles and with what effects.
The first ones to address these issues were Agarwal and Narain (1991). They estimated the
repercussions of equitably sharing between countries a given global Carbon “budget” on an
equal per person basis. Their total emissions per annum were constrained to not exceed a level
that can be absorbed by the environment (the “Carbon sink”, estimated at 17,500 Mt of CO2).
On that basis they estimated what countries’ permissible emissions were and compared these
with their actual emissions. Excess emissions (net emissions to the atmosphere, estimated at
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Fig. 2 Global carbon space (2◦) sharing between annex I and non-annex I countries (2000–2050). Source:
Baer et al. (2008)
traded to those in need of such permits.6 At the same time my own research council worked
on a whole set of EUS-subspaces including one for CO2-emissions (Weterings and Opschoor
1992). Based on pre-UNCED data we estimated that global emissions in 2040 would have
to be reduced by 80% compared to what they would otherwise be, and that in the remaining
carbon space 15% should be the share of the North (rather than 75%), and 85% should go to
the developing countries, if we accepted equal per capita emissions as a standard. Work like
that has been going on since then and the numbers were refined and up-dated. It is interesting
to see that figures now presented to the negotiations toward the new global climate agreement
still suggest the need of reductions of 80% or even more in 2050.
Equal per capita entitlements seem one more or less ‘natural’ moral principle. Agarwal
and Narain (1998) discern essentially 2 ways of elaborating this: (i) equal shares in a global
carbon budget (e.g. the global carbon sink, as in their 1991 application), (ii) a long term
converging per capita emissions target consistent with global emissions keeping warming
below an agreed cap. Of course, there are other ways of cutting the emissions pie than
egalitarian ones. Countries may claim or be allocated shares based on their current levels of
emissions. This is done in practice when introducing emissions trading schemes, and is called
‘grandfathering’. Note that the second proposal by Agarwal and Narain allows starting with
grandfathering to end up with equal per capita emission shares after some period in which
convergence is to occur. This may be an appealing idea allowing for some flexibility in the
initial stages —but still it may not be easy to achieve.7
6 Similar schemes were put forward by other CSOs; e.g. WCC 2000 proposed a Global Atmospheric Com-
mons Fund based on equal per capita emissions under a sustainable level of emissions. Countries using in
excess of the permitted emission level would pay a use penalty from which developing countries should be
assisted in moving towards a carbon-free or—poor economy.
7 Based on econometric analysis Barassi et al. (2008) show that per capita CO2 emissions among OECD
countries in 1950–2002 showed no convergence. If it did not happen there, it is likely to meet with more hur-
dles if we consider global convergence. As the authors say: tackling these political hurdles “… may impose a
burden of significant adjustment costs due to the required re-distribution of emissions” (ibid: 134).
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A system based on equal (or fair) per capita entitlements within a space that is actually
sustainable ecologically, is the most fundamental—and in the long run perhaps the most
socially acceptable—approach. There are difficulties associated with it, though,8 and it may
not be the most suitable way of bringing equity considerations to bear on ways of dealing
with climate or climate-related problems. Equity has different dimensions or can be pursued
following different approaches. Ashton and Wang (2003) list: (i) Responsibility, (ii) Capacity
to act, (iii) Equal entitlements, (iv) “Basic needs” (or: solidarity), and (v) Comparable effort.
For practical purposes (iv) can be seen as another element next to (iii) in a category “provi-
sions sharing”, and (v) can be linked with (ii). So essentially we are left with (in addition to
sharing): responsibility and capacity—categories that we shall meet in the next section when
we address equity in relation to burden sharing.
6 Sharing the Burdens of Mitigation and Adaptation
Entitlements to emissions are one way of looking at sharing emissions, but given the need to
fit all emitters into the shrinking carbon space it is also interesting to step through the looking
glass and consider responsibilities for staying within it—the mirror image of entitlements.
This is important when the concern is how to deal internationally with a threat to humanity
like climate change. Then the question becomes: how to share the burden of ensuring that
the worlds’ economies stay within the carbon space.
Art. 3 of UNFCCC stipulates the following principle:
The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future gen-
erations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common
but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.
This principle is the cornerstone of the Convention.9 Two broad normative notions are intro-
duced here: that of responsibility (e.g. based on historical roles in causing global warming,
or on the notion that the polluter should pay, for mitigation of for damage or adaptation)
and capability (based on the observation that the economically more advanced countries can
more easily carry the burden of mitigating climate change). Responsibilities could be mea-
sured by emissions (of GHGs, or of particular ones such as CO2) and parameters capturing
land use change. Emissions could be measured by taking the actual per annum values or by
taking cumulated emissions; in the latter case different staring (and end) dates could be con-
sidered. Emissions may also be measured as excess emissions above some entitlement (e.g.
the share in the carbon sink, cf Agarwal and Narain 1991), or as emissions for consumption
beyond basic needs or some other “development threshold”- related entitlement (Baer et al.
2008). Capabilities can be measured in various way too, but it is fairly common to take some
measure of ‘capacity to pay’ (as in the IVM/PBL-”scenarios”, Dellink et al. 2008), i.e. per
8 Equal entitlements has many problems. If applied, e.g. through public ownership and access, delivery in
practice may easily deviate from intended access. And: why would this resource be shared equitably if this is
not done in case of other resources? Another issue is: do entitlements not have to vary if we want, for reasons
of fairness, to differentiate according to variations in domestic (or even regional/local) circumstances? And,
last but not least: how can larger de facto per capita emitters be induced to accept such schemes?
9 Other principles are: (i) full consideration to the specific needs and special circumstances of developing
country Parties, especially those that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change; (ii)
the precautionary principle: where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific
certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing such measures; (iii) the right and duty to promote
sustainable development: (iv) the duty to cooperate to promote a supportive and open international economic
system that would lead to sustainable economic growth and development.
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capita income or GDP, or per capita income beyond a certain threshold (as in the RC-index
proposed by Baer et al. 2008). “Capabilities” may also be based on the Human Development
Index (as in OXFAM’s Adaptation Financing Index—OXFAM 2007). Table 2 summarises
country shares in global warming responsibilities and capabilities.
Before detailing the calculations behind Table 2, let me articulate what the table conveys.
These are all possible keys to attributing responsibilities for burden sharing. Apart from the
OXFAM AFI they show a range of calculated shares for Annex I countries, from 52–77%,
the balance being put on the plates of developing countries. Giving responsibility to Annex
I countries only, would, of course bring the total for these countries up to 100%. Secondly, it
makes a large difference whether one looks at current emission levels (per capita, or total) or
at cumulative emissions. Thirdly, weighing contributions to emissions by income measures
makes a difference as well, especially when this is done in a progressive way—e.g. by absolv-
ing people or countries with low incomes (last 3 columns). Of course if we look at countries
along a sliding scale sensitive to their long term economic growth and expected emissions
(RCI/2030 versus RCI/2010), then countries like China and India are debited much more
than when static status quo approaches were followed.
Observations like these go some way in explaining positions taken at conference tables
where climate policies are discussed. It is in the interest of developing countries to prevent
that they are saddled with commitments beyond what the Bali Action plan calls for (action
that is in these countries’ own interest quite apart from the climate issue). It is in their inter-
est that they emphasise the logic of ‘historical legacy’ in defence of responsibilities falling
largely on developed countries—which, as a matter of course, take opposite positions. And
in fact these discussions are not irrelevant from a financial or economic perspective. The
need for new and additional means for climate—related action in developing countries alone
is around a level of roughly $200 billion per year for mitigation and $70 (or 50–100) bil-
lion for adaptation. If context is needed to understand the significance of these figures: the
total amount of ODA disbursed by the same countries that are assumed to cough up these
$200–300 billions is currently at $100–120 billion!
Differences in outcomes reflect differences in assumptions or other choices made in the
application of responsibility/capability criteria. IVM/PBL (Dellink et al. 2008) calculate the
repercussions of attributing responsibilities in terms of emissions (measured in a variety of
ways) weighted by capacity to pay (measured in relation to GDP or according to UN-contribu-
tions) in seven ‘scenarios’. As can be expected, the results are dependent on the assumptions
made and the indicators chosen. The differences can be large, especially when allotting shares
is done based on a progressive scale; much of the difference vanishes when proportionality
with GDP is the point of departure. Baer et al. (2008) base their RCIs on calculations start-
ing from personal income levels. They propose that below a certain treshold emissions are
related to necessities and that to ensure staying within warming caps households below that
threshold should be exempted from having to contribute to fighting global warming (they
suggest a level of PPP$ 7,500 pppa, and estimate this would protect some 70% of the world
population).10 Thus, income distribution comes in and the wealthy in developing countries
are to contribute to mitigation and adaptation costs and investments as well as developed
countries. For responsibility they take countries’ cumulative emissions since 1990 excluding
emissions corresponding with sub-threshold consumption. These two measures they com-
bine into one “Responsibility-Capacity Index (RCI)”. The RCI has a dynamic variant using
projections (of GDP, population, cumulative emissions) leading to evolving values for the
10 In their 1991 paper Agarwal and Narain distinguished “survival emissions” (emissions related to meet-




index as the underlying values change. In its static form, RCI is similar to OXFAM’s AFI
(OXFAM 2007), which used emissions for responsibility (CO2, av over 1992–2003 beyond
2 tonnes pppa), and capability as measured by the 2004 UNDP Human Development Index
(countries with HDI >.9 only).
A sensitivity analysis on the RCI showed that by 2030 all runs of their model do put
global emissions down to 50% form the 1990 values. In developing countries emissions will
double compared with 1990, but they will be about half of the BaU-values for those countries.
Least Developed countries would be able to grow even more: to emissions about 3 times their
1990 forerunners. Secondly, bringing the threshold down from US$(PPP) 7,500 to 5,000
will make non-Annex I countries have to further reduce emissions by some 5%, which eases
pressures on Annex I countries by over 25%. This will also impact on financial contributions
per person: it would bring that down globally by some 20% and even more in Non-Annex I
countries, especially low income countries and LDCs.
7 Differentiation
We saw that the carbon space consistent with below 2◦ warming is dwindling rapidly as we
move closer to 2050. If the world is to stay within it, then developed economies—the wealth-
iest sources of greenhouse gases should quickly and deeply engage in mitigation. Figure 2
suggests that even if Annex I countries were to have stopped all CO2 emissions by 2050, then
developing countries, if they kept their emissions at current levels, would still emit over 5
GtC, which would bring global CO2-emissions to levels 2.5 times above the allowed C-space.
Sooner rather than later all the worlds largest sources need to mitigate– whether wealthy or
not. This is understood (see the BAP, UNFCCC 2007)—but the extent to which and the
conditions under which are highly contested. The battleground has a name: ‘differentiation’.
To allocate responsibilities while taking into account capabilities, UNFCCC distinguishes
(‘differentiates’) between developing countries (non-Annex I) and developed ones (Annex
I; the latter further distinguished into the OECD countries -Annex II- and other). These cat-
egories reflect national conditions as prevailing in 1992 (cf Art. 31). The BAP, when dealing
with mitigation, stipulates that all developed country parties must consider mitigation com-
mitments, with comparability of effort to be ensured by taking into account differences in
their national circumstances. Developing countries are to consider nationally appropriate
mitigation actions, in the context of sustainable development and supported and enabled by
technology, financing and capacity building (BAP Art 1.b, UNFCCC 2007b).
Some developed (Annex I) countries have claimed that many developing countries must
also consider committing to targets for reducing emissions or improving energy efficiency,
and that some might even “graduate” into an up-dated Annex I.11 A redefinition of “devel-
oped” and “developing countries” under BAP was proposed, and criteria for differentiation
suggested, including HDI, GDP (total and per capita) and share of world emissions. This
further differentiation (beyond Annex I/Non-Annex I) thus seeks to reflect changing and
differing national circumstances across all countries—including developing ones—to ensure
equitable CC-mitigation (see e.g. Ott et al. 2004; Hohne et al. 2008; Karousis et al. 2008;
OXFAM 2008). However, the developing countries generally reject this—essentially on the
ground that developed countries are historically responsible for most of the warming and
that they should therefore be the only ones to undertake binding commitments to address its
11 For a substantiation of this, see, e.g. Ott et al. (2004) and Hohne et al. (2008).
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causes.12 It may be understandable that non-Annex I countries object to their group being
split up in divisions at the risk of losing influence in international climate negotiations. At the
same time, in my opinion it is desirable (and in fact inevitable) to look for options to enable
mitigation efforts to be shared between those countries that are capable to undertake them
and historically responsible (i.e. Annex I countries) and those who, related to their contribu-
tions to current and future commitment, show a potential to mitigate (the phrase as well as
the proposal is due to: Ott et al. 2004) since their emissions are significant in the global total.
The South Centre (2007, 13) argues that: “… a possible arrangement could be one where
developed countries are required to cut their GHG emissions by at least 95% below 2000
levels by 2050. Developing countries … especially … those whose emissions already, or
will in the near future, contribute significantly to atmospheric GHG concentrations—should
also engage by ensuring that, conditioned on the provision of appropriate technology trans-
fer and adequate technical and financial support from developed countries, their voluntary
national climate change plans aim for GHG emissions reductions … in ways and levels that
are appropriate to their development needs and priorities” (the italics are mine). I would
applaud that if also the footnote to this statement applies (ibid.): “A differentiated approach
that takes into account the specific development conditions and requirements of individual
developing countries, and which promotes the participation of the developed and developing
countries that contribute the most to total GHG emissions in a global agreement to reduce
GHG emissions would seem to be the most feasible.”
Different schemes have been put forward to elaborate this (Ott et al. 2004; Hohne et al.
2008; Baer et al. 2008).13 Each of these approaches suggests a different ranking of coun-
tries; Karousis et al. (2008) show that those various measures are not correlated between
themselves. No single index captures all of these considerations. If these single indexes are
amalgamated into reasonable composite indicators, then much more correlation shows up;
and there is much more consistency between associated country rankings. This suggests
that through negotiating about such more complex measures of potential, responsibility and
capability, agreements might be possible.
But the main point of this section is, that the global carbon space has dwindled to such
an extent that staying within the remainder of it can only be done if substantial mitigation
occurs in developing countries, and that this requires not only convincing and far reaching a
12 The Hoikaido Toyako G8-Summit (July 2008) established that the G-8 agreed to implement ambitious
mid-term mitigation goals and welcomed the proposals by MDBs and donors to establish funds in support
of efforts of developing countries in investing in climate. The “major developing economies” (Brazil, China,
India, Indonesia, Korea, Mexico, South Africa) approved this G-8 approach and agreed to pursue “…nationally
appropriate mitigation actions, supported and enabled by technology, financing and capacity-building, with a
view to achieving a deviation from business as usual emissions” (Hokkaido Toyota Summit 2008). This seems
to go slightly beyond the mere recognisiton of the commitment to undertake NAMAs. At least one of these,
RSA, is committed to declining its emissions significantly after 2030–2035 and is ready to do more if and
when international support is forthcoming (according to its statement at CoP14 in Poznan, 2008).
13 Ott et al. (2004) elaborated a possible scheme for this (with different mitigation menus) for the following
‘groups of countries’: Annex II, Annex I but not Annex II, NICs (newly industrialized countries), RIDCs
(rapidly industrialized countries), Other DCs, and LDCs. Hohne et al. (2008) detail this in terms of specific
countries’ commitments below ‘business as usual’ for 6 NICs and RIDCs in several ‘scenarios’: a “no regret
scenario” (with reduction options at zero or negative costs), a “co-benefit scenario” (with positive costs but
compensated by other societal benefits in the mitigating country) and an “ambitious scenario” (with uncom-
pensated net costs, unless through financial support by outside donors). Most countries could contribute with
reductions below BaU at levels from 15% up to 40%, with financial support or technical assistance. As we
saw, Baer et al. (2008) have operationalised this in a combined responsibility/capability index excluding emis-
sions due to meeting basic needs (liberally defined), in a way that does indeed bring in rapidly industrializing
countries according to their potentials, and that also takes into account historical ‘legacy’-considerations (i.e.:
it is based on cumulative emissions) (see Table 2).
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priori commitments by the industrialised countries to engage in mitigation but also a man-
ifest and convincing readiness to help developing countries (financially, technologically) to
also engage in mitigation at the necessary levels. This could help overcome the trust gap
mentioned before as one of the main hurdles on the way to a global agreement. It also is in
the interest of industrialised countries to engage in this.
8 Climate Change and Making Development More Sustainable
Development and poverty eradication require economic growth. Carbon-based growth is no
longer an option. How can the world (North and South) de-carbonise in a fair and effective
way and stay within an acceptable carbon space? We have seen that such a V-turn may be
technically and economically feasible if the political will were there.
According to IPCC (2007, 21): “making development more sustainable by changing devel-
opment paths can make a major contribution to climate change mitigation…”. It points at
synergies that would lead to benefits in the climate domain as well as in the development
domain—traditional, or sustainable development. It is obvious that changes in investment,
production and consumption patterns are required.
Major impulses towards such changes are expected from bringing external social costs
(including costs to future generations) into decision-making by major polluters through rais-
ing prices of energy and introducing Carbon pricing (e.g. by creating markets for emission
permits and similar devices). Such institutional change is envisaged as part of the concept
of sustainable development (see definition above). Harnessing market forces towards mit-
igation may also generate adverse spinoffs in developing countries (trade effects, negative
distributional effects, etc. Moreover, if warming is to be halted, then mitigation is to occur
in developing countries beyond what they might undertake in view of net benefits to their
own populations. And finally, we have seen that technological innovation is to occur on a
large scale to enable adequate mitigation. These elements combined call for a policy-driven
approach also in developing countries, with a strong component of North-South co-operation,
including a strong investment programme, to create the necessary institutional capacities, to
stimulate carbon-free innovation and green investment, (cf CDP 2007). Much of the finance
needed for such investment programmes may be harvested from carbon markets or emission
permits markets generally, but not all of it.
This is the top-down view. For both developing and developed countries another observa-
tion by IPCC is also highly pertinent: “national circumstances and the strengths of institutions
determine how development policies impact GHG emissions. Changes in development paths
emerge from the interactions of public and private decision processes involving government,
business and civil society”. So the top-down approach must and should be complemented
by a bottom-up one towards making development more sustainable. That in itself—if done
in a ‘climate resilient’ way—would primarily enhance effective adaptation, and then also
deal with mitigation. As far as mitigation is concerned, one very promising example is the
emergence of so-called “global action networks” operating in a collective action perspec-
tive (Glasbergen et al. 2007; Ostrom 1990). Indeed, a diversity of institutional change will
be required to make development, across the globe, more sustainable (cf. e.g. Dolsak and
Ostrom 2003) and this must go far beyond the involvement of market forces alone—critical
though their contribution may be. It is here that I refer back to my earlier observations of such
forces in the global economy, related to their lack of embeddedness, short-sightedness, their
tendency to cost-shifting and uncritical orientation on forces of economic growth and tech-
nical innovation. What is needed to effectively respond to these critiques is the emergence of
political will and capability to manage globalisation and its agents towards the satisfaction of
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common needs and the provision of global public goods—supplementary to what the market
may be made to deliver. And what is even more complex, making development sustainable
and climate proof in this way will require changes in prevailing cultures in relation to soci-
ety-biosphere relationships, human welfare and the role in it of material consumption, and a
new global ethos based on accountability, solidarity and care.
In terms of proposals to work towards such lofty aims, what do we see of this when we
look around us? In and around the UN system initiatives for green development or green
climate and energy related development schemes abound.
For instance, UNEP’s “Green Economy Initiative” and its subsequent plan for a Global
Green New Deal (UNEP 2009) want to gear the world’s readiness to take anti-cyclical action
in the face of the economic crisis towards structural transformations in technology, pro-
duction and consumption, and resource management. UNEP too recognises market failures
and rightly adds the failure of governments to intelligently and prudently manage and focus
markets. The plan aims at: (i) reviving the global economy and saving and creating jobs;
(ii) reducing carbon-dependency and ecosystem degradation; (iii) advance sustainable and
inclusive growth, achievement of the MDGs and the end of extreme poverty by 2015. Regard-
ing employment generation through “green” jobs, in the domain of renewable energy alone
UNEP 2008 envisages the possibility of over 2 million new jobs. UNEP suggests this could
be done by an injection valued at 1% of global GDP, or about 1/4th of what is being made
available for fiscal stimulus). The plan is sectorally detailed, has the usual institutional pro-
posals for incorporating externalities in prices (e.g. through taxes) and harnessing of market
forces, and adds to that an “international policy architecture” providing a framework for and
co-ordination of the transition towards a more sustainable economic system. The initiative
builds on the earlier Green Jobs Initiative by UNEP, ILO and non-governmental organisations
like the International Trades Union Confederation.
UN-DESA (the Department of Economic and Social Affairs) falls in line with this by pro-
posing a Global New Deal for Sustainable Development” as part of a broader counter-cyclical
response to the current economic crisis (DESA 2009). It adds to the UNEP proposal a more
manifest focus on domestic fiscal stimulus in developing countries, and a more explicit focus
on poor and vulnerable groups. Here too a number of specific activities are outlined.
Outside the UN similar ideas have been floated (e.g. Obama’s “Green New Deal” for the
USA and the calls for more inclusive and even green recovery plans I mentioned before)
The Potsdam Institute/LSE proposal for global green recovery (Edenhofer and Stern 2009)
to the G20 as they discussed the economic crisis. That plan (in which the economic crisis
and the climate crisis are explicitly linked) has much less of a development focus than the
ones mentioned above, focuses on energy technologies and infrastructure, clean technology
markets and asks for co-ordinated efforts by the G20. At the time of writing this address,
the G20 had not responded to this—despite the earlier noises made by it and by relevant
political actors associated with it, when the economic crisis was first discussed by the G20
in November 2008. Indeed, it is important to avoid recovery in the direction of: back to
the usual. Certainly, the crisis and the efforts to address it provide an opportunity to change
course. The word needs to know where it wants to be if it is to decide which direction to
take and it is right to articulate sustainable, equitable, human development orientations. But
we need to develop a robustness necessary for turning these tactics into embedded national
and international strategies if they are to be sustained in the period after the recession is over.
A more structural and strategic approach is suggested by the UN Committee for Devel-
opment Policy (CDP 2007, 2009) for an innovation-cum-investment oriented approach to
dealing with climate changing emissions. As a development strategy it is to serve and help
meet the needs of the present generation, by expanding options for improving livelihoods
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and wellbeing. As a sustainable development strategy it is to ensure that this meeting of
present needs does not go at the expense of options and possibilities for welfare generation in
future—both for people alive today and for at least the next 2 or 3 generations. And as a cli-
mate-focused strategy within the perspective of sustainable development, it is to ensure that
emissions will be cut. Most of the world’s power plant construction over the next 40 years and
most of the world’s primary energy consumption growth will take place in developing coun-
tries. Where new plants are constructed they must be made is carbon free as possible: plant
construction “freezes” (“locks in”) carbon-efficiencies for their entire life span—typically
30 to 40 years. The so-called “incremental costs’ of going for carbon-free or carbon-poor
alternatives in energy investment are to be funded with international support.
Incentives need to be identified and provided for economic growth and development
along pathways that are ecologically and socially sustainable and are climate neutral and
climate change-resilient. The strategy should boost efforts in research and development of
new technologies and alternative, renewable and cleaner energy sources that are appropriate
in a developing countries’ context and in a sustainable development perspective, and capac-
ity building for mitigation as well as adaptation, and development—oriented research and
policy articulation. An innovation and investment-oriented strategy like this could generate
opportunities for economic activities on the international market.
This strategy amounts to a more development oriented alternative to Sachs (2008)
‘economics for a crowded planet’ aiming at tackling, through global public investments
towards sustainable development, a portfolio of risks like climate change, extreme poverty
biodiversity loss, population growth (ibid: p. 11). He puts forward a menu of environment
friendly and energy saving innovation, strategies to escape the poverty trap, and devel-
opment—thereby proposing a growth/technology-oriented way out. In the climate/energy
domain he too proposes developing market based incentives e.g. through trading carbon (or
GHG) emission permits, and huge R&D-efforts, with additional funding to be provided by
developed countries. His plan for global sustainable development also suggests public inter-
ventions in the areas of support for the destitute, key infrastructure, social insurance, research
and development, stewardship over natural resources and generally support a globalisation
based on the idea of a social welfare model. Sachs’ analysis is based on an acknowledgement
of market failure in globalisation as we know it, and of the need for policy intervention to
guard the interests of future generations and other marginalised stakeholders. Yet, his anal-
ysis (as well as that of most others mentioned above) does not contain serious and critical
analysis of the underlying institutional structures and driving forces. When it comes to curb-
ing climate change and unsustainability in the global market-based) economy they remain
largely investment/technology/growth oriented and at best call for co-ordination between
international agents, in a top-down perspective, without giving much attention to the com-
plementary bottom-up process, the need for countervailance in power relations, the need for
cultural and ideological change in the “global North” (wherever that manifests itself). It is here
that I hope ISS and like-minded social science institutes will join forces and provide embed-
ded, accountable, responsive institutional options that can be considered for incorporation in
climate strategies once the world has decided it is really going to tackle climate change.
9 Some Final Observations
In concluding this address, let me summarise some main pints and look ahead a little.
Climate change is perhaps the most burning (excusez le mot) issue amongst the global envi-
ronmental concerns and a prominent one on the world development agenda. The multilateral
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community must develop a capability and a readiness to prevent dangerous human-made
warming within a time frame that allows enable economic development to proceed in a sus-
tainable, climate change-resilient and climate-proof manner. Scientific evidence suggest this
to mean a cap on warming at 2◦C or less, by 2100. This then defines a ‘carbon space’. Claims
on that space are growing rapidly and threaten to move the world beyond it—in unsafe danger
zones—ecologically, socio-economically, technically.
Deep cuts in emissions of GHGs are required to stay within the carbon space. If by
2100 the world is to be under the 2◦-cap and if average incomes and population levels are
to be according to expectations, then carbon per unit of GDP is to be reduced by almost
90% globally. In fact, the global carbon space has dwindled to such an extent that staying
within it can only be done if substantial mitigation occurs in developing countries—how-
ever, one must realise that they were not prime responsibility for this dwindling so far nor
do they have the capabilities (financially, technologically) to take on mitigation commit-
ments. Compounding these concerns, the carbon space needs to be shared in a way that
is considered fair and this requires “convergence” of currently widely unequal per capita
emissions.
Some of the factors accounting for the present lack of progress in achieving a climate agree-
ment are rooted in a deep deficit of trust between developed and developing countries. This
deficit must be overcome if an effective and adequate compact is to be achieved. That implies
that OECD countries take a convincing lead in emissions reduction, share their knowledge
and other capabilities in this field with developing countries, co-develop new technologies
and management regimes for energy use, and co-fund efforts especially where these lead to
incremental costs and incremental efforts. The finance required for this is huge—though still
a small fraction of World (or even OECD) Product. Such funds are not easily raised, even
if future new markets for emission permits other mechanisms might be capable of generat-
ing large portions of it. Consensus of what, in this context, equitable burden sharing would
mean, is not easily achieved—though not impossible. It requires agreement about criteria to
apply—such as ‘responsibility’, ‘capability’ and ‘potential’ and how to quantify these. In the
latter area alone, very wide-ranging outcomes have been found—though, again, agreement
on such formulae is not inconceivable.
Green New Deals as proposed in the context of a widened response to the current eco-
nomic crisis could become a beginning of a fundamental shift towards a decarbonised global
economy. So far, though, such green new deals have not left their drawing board. Moreover,
they would represent a beginning only, to be sustained well beyond recession recovery peri-
ods. This complex global threat calls for an international response ensuring the availability
of sufficient carbon space to develop. The world, in all its regions, needs to avoid the pitfalls
of carbon-dependent economic growth and find alternative, more sustainable development
trajectories. That is an issue of changing patterns and pathways of investment and innovation,
as well as of production and consumption. Concerns to do with equity as well as sustainabil-
ity must be incorporated and integrated into coherent transitory strategies. Conceptually, this
is clear and many plans for this have been elaborated—though not yet adopted in tangible
development planning. Perhaps they need further work: researching and developing. But
their getting implemented also need a change in political will.
I conclude with an observation rooted in political economy/institutional economics:
greater global equity as well as ecological sustainability can be achieved only by inter-
nationally co-ordinated and implemented policies improving the endowments of countries
and people, and capable of dealing with the relevant world market imperfections. The insti-
tutional repercussions of this are yet to be elaborated; the end of radical neo-liberalism may
provide a policy space for this.
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